The BritCard Digital ID Psyop

Apparently, in order to be able to work in the UK, we will all be forced to adopt digital ID—the mandatory so-called BritCard. There is absolutely no public appetite for this, as the more than 2 million and rising (at the time of writing) signatures to the online petition to stop it demonstrates.

Of course, online petitions don’t make any difference to governments, but at least they illustrate to us that government propaganda, such as the IPSOS poll that alleges 57% of the UK public want digital ID, is garbage. Though given IPSOS enormous number of government contracts, including its contract to assist in the design of the BritCard, willingly fulfilling its propaganda role is understandable.

Proudly announcing mandatory digital ID at the Global Progress Action Summit, Keir Starmer said:

Let me spell that out. You will not be able to work in the United Kingdom if you do not have Digital ID. It’s as simple as that.

This all sounds very “authoritarian,” but if we decide we are not going to adopt the BritCard, and if the UK government insists on enforcing it, the entire UK economy and the government will collapse. If government issued digital ID is “mandatory” to work in the UK, and millions, perhaps tens of millions, of people decide they are not going along with it, then that means mass unemployment, a vanishing government tax take, and economic destruction on a cataclysmic scale.

The government can be as tough as it likes, but if we tell it to do one there is sweet FA it can do about it. The government only has power while we comply, if we don’t it has absolutely none at all. It’s a paper tiger. We have all the power, we just have to realise it by not complying.

Clearly, there is no need for a UK digital ID. In a moment of stupidity, the UK Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy, told the BBC that the national ID card would be the same as a national insurance number (NIN), insofar as you won’t be able to work without one. It didn’t occur to her that having a NIN is indeed a prerequisite for employment in the UK and, therefore, no one needs a government digital ID. Assuming, that is, the government’s claimed justification is remotely plausible. Which it isn’t

The government has exploited illegal immigration as an excuse to supposedly introduce digital ID:

[Digital ID] will [. . .] be required for right to work checks to stop those with no right to be in the country from finding work. This is to send a clear message that if you come here illegally, you will not be able to work, deterring people from making dangerous journeys.

There are few glaring problems with this ludicrous argument.

For a start, you can’t get a NIN if you are in the UK illegally. Those who employ people illegally couldn’t care less whether you have a NIN or not, just as they won’t care if a slave labourer has a BritCard or not. No “message” will be sent because those who come here illegally do so knowing it is illegal and the BritCard won’t make any difference to them either. Nor will trafficked illegal immigrants be deterred because they don’t have a choice and the traffickers show no signs of giving up on their multi-billion dollar industry which, in any event, digital ID will do nothing to hinder.

In addition, if they receive leave to remain, refugees and asylum seekers can secure a NIN for themselves and work here legally. So, all in all, the government’s argument for introducing digital ID is total codswallop.

It is obvious that tackling illegal migration has nothing to do with the UK governments alleged hope of foisting digital ID on us all. It is equally obvious that the restricting the right to work is not really the purpose of digital ID:

A new digital ID scheme will make it easier for people across the UK to use vital government services. The roll-out will in time make it easier to apply for government and private sector services, such as helping renters to quickly prove their identity to landlords, improving access to welfare and other benefits, and making it easier for parents to apply for free childcare.

So, “in time,” we will supposedly need digital ID to access services like child care, to receive “welfare and other benefits,” and to rent a home. But that’s not all. We will also need it to access “private sector services” such as those offered by banks. You’ll need your government approved digital ID to buy a home too, in time.

In short, a state issued digital ID gives the state total control over your life and, to a great extent, the economy.

Currently migrants given leave to stay, either permanently or temporarily, can use government issued biometric ID—digital identity that contains biological information—to “open a bank account.” Starmer’s biometric BritCard, and all digital ID, merely extends that government mandated “privilege” to the rest of us.

Starmer is a globalist member of numerous policy think tanks, including the Trilateral Commission. The policy to enforce digital ID on everyone has nothing to do with his government. That Policy emanated from globalist think tanks, like the Trilateral Commission, and was set by the United Nations as SDG 16.9 in 2016.

Starmer and the UK government are seemingly doing what they are told. But something doesn’t quite add up.

The global digital ID systems and networks that have been put into place, to date, do not require the issuance of any single biometric digital ID card or app. Rather, a smorgasbord of “vendor agnostic” digital ID products can be made “interoperable” and share data in a uniform machine readable format. If the SDG 16.9 plans for data interoperability proceed as envisaged, the data from your UK biometric digital ID driving licence—which you probably already possess—and your biometric digital ID passport, for instance, could be linked to all your purchases through your interoperable digital bank card.

The data from all these “vendor agnostic” digital ID products, because they each use interoperable machine readable data exchange formats, can then be hoovered up to the global digital ID database. At present, the World Bank’s ID4D looks like the most likely candidate. The UN’s World Bank has set the interoperability data standards that the digital ID database requires and has divided them into five categories:

Major standards to facilitate the technical quality and interoperability of the ID system related to: (1) biometrics, (2) cards, (3) 2D barcodes, (4) digital signatures, and (5) federation protocols.

For example, the Indian government’s Aadhaar unique digital ID card (or app) uses “the ISO/IEC 19794 Series and ISO/IEC 19785 for biometric data interchange formats.” These are approved World Bank ID4D interoperability standards. In this case, Indian’s biometric data can be exported in a “machine-readable format enabling ease of import into” the SDG 16.9 compliant global ID4D database.

In July 2022, the ID2020 Alliance—the group tasked with fulfilling SDG 16.9—appointed Clive Smith as its new executive director. Clive was the former Director of Global Operations at the United Nations Foundation Mobile Health Alliance. Speaking about his new role, Clive said:

ID2020 can play a pivotal role, helping ensure that the appropriately interoperable solutions – and related financial, legal, and regulatory guardrails – are in place, and become the foundation of digital ID in the decades ahead.

The interoperable digital infrastructure is the key to constructing our digital IDs from interlinked vendor agnostic digital ID products. In effect, our digital ID can be manufactured by the system, as we interact with it, without us having any one, designated digital ID app or card. That is the point of digital ID-linked product interoperability.

The UK government already has an SDG 16.9 compatible biometric digital ID platform called One Login. It is part of the Government Digital Service (GDS) and provides users with access to government services via their GOV.UK digital wallets. The system is hopelessly insecure and the risk of identity theft is high, but all digital ID systems are prone to criminal misuse, so there’s nothing unusual there.

In India R.S. Sharma, Chairman of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), decided to demonstrate that claims of digital ID security flaws were all “conspiracy theories.” He published his Aadhaar number on, what was then, Twitter to prove the system was secure. Within hours, hackers had released his mobile number(s), personal Gmail and Yahoo addresses, his home address, date of birth, frequent flyer number, private photographs and bank account details to which—for a laugh but making their point—they sent some small payments.

Nevertheless, the interoperable digital ID infrastructure that is being installed globally means there are no technological reasons to account for the UK government’s attempt to introduce an extremely unpopular single, government issued digital ID. Especially seeing as it already has a digital ID system (One Login) that uses existing ID, such as driving licenses, to essentially achieve the same thing that the BritCard is supposed to deliver.

Compounding this unfathomable government strategy, the British have a long history of objecting to government issued ID. To expect us to go along with it this time is nonsensical.

Government issued ID was introduced in the First World War and abolished by public demand in 1919. They were reintroduced shortly after the start of the Second World War and withdrawn in 1952, again due to public opposition. The Blair Labour government tried again in 2010 and, though it was cost and election defeat, rather than unpopularity, that saw that attempt fail, government issued ID was widely opposed nonetheless. The government knows such national ID projects are extremely unpopular and it must have anticipated a political backlash.

Not only that, Starmer’s government decided to formally announce another government issued ID at a time when its popularity has never been lower. Notably, leading voices in the UK Reform Party have already taken a stance against the BritCard, as have those in the Conservative Party. Nor does the announcement do anything to assuage Labour’s alleged concerns about the so-called “far-right” as its supposed leaders have also come out against the BritCard move.

There is no realistic prospect that the government is going to get people to adopt its ridiculous BritCards. From Starmer’s and the Labour government’s perspective, this looks like political suicide. What’s going on?

After its initial leaky debacle, the contract for the cyber security for the government’s One Login was given to the US multinational Accenture led by Julie Sweet who sits on the Board of Trustees for both the World Economic Forum and the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Accenture is partnered with Peter Thiel’s Palantir and Thiel sits on the Steering Committee of the Bilderberg Group. Both Accenture and Palantir are strategic partners with Larry Elllison’s Oracle. Ellison, like Thiel, is currently highly influential within the US government. All three companies have close links to the intelligence agencies, but Palantir’s and Oracle’s are very close.

Palantir is deeply embedded within the UK government and its defence and health sector. Oracle is similarly central to the digital transformation of UK government and, as we have just discussed, so is Accenture. These US Tech giants, led by people close to the centre of global power, all want to see digital ID succeed in the UK and fully back UN SDG 16.9.

Ellison is known to be a close associate of former UK prime minister Tony Blair and reportedly the money-man behind the Tony Blair Institute (TBI). The TBI has been pushing for digital ID in the UK for years. But what is digital ID really about for think tanks and policy setting groups like the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Group and the TBI?

It is all about using the harvested data to control our lives. Lest you have any doubt, in September 2024, Ellison told Oracle investors:

Citizens will be on their best behavior because we are constantly recording and reporting everything that’s going on.

In February this year, the TBI published a blueprint for what it calls the UK’s National Data Library (NDL). The TBI wants the data from all corners of the society and the economy, all public and private services, all industry, all business and all of us, to be stored in one unified central database: the NDL.

However, in order for the NDL to work, the TBI noted:

Harmonised personal identifiers, using a consistent number to refer to the same entity in different places, should be introduced to improve interoperability. [. . .] None of this would be possible without efforts to improve the broader data infrastructure, including efforts around interoperability and digital identity. [. . .] This allows the NDL to focus on closing a critical gap by addressing the legal, operational and structural barriers that prevent effective data use. Interoperability and even linkage efforts, welcome as they are, do not guarantee access or usability.

Clearly, the TBI is acutely aware of the interoperability that lies at the heart of the global digital transformation. The One Login GDS system is prepped for the completion of the necessary digital infrastructure. Digital ID is the linchpin that sets the entire system in motion. Therefore, it is essential to the government and its partners—Palantir, Accenture, and Oracle, etc.,—that we can somehow be cajoled into accepting digital ID.

Starmer’s BritCard is not intended to convince us to adopt digital ID. Its announcement is spectacularly ill-timed, the arguments offered to justify it are absurd and there is no reason to think the British public will ever buy in to it.

It is not unreasonable to speculate that BritCard is a bait-and-switch psyop.

The BritCard has stimulated debate about digital ID. I’m sure Newsnight and Question Time will cover it. We can argue the pros and cons and consider if we want digital ID. Then we will either accept or reject the BritCard, imagining that it is the totality of digital ID, and the issue will be resolved. Which I think is the point of BritCard.

The most likely outcome is that as anger is stoked and resentment swells, the completely unnecessary BritCard will be flung out along with the Labour government: again.

The door will then be open for the political saviours, be they the Tories, Reform or whomever, to come to power promising never to subject us to any more of these idiotic government issued ID schemes.

However, to keep pace with the digital revolution, our digital infrastructure, our cards and licenses, will need to be upgraded to facilitate the necessary interoperability.

Voila! We will rejoice in our victory and accept digital ID without even knowing it.